diff options
author | kwm <kwm@058c260c-8361-11dd-a0ac-aa2bafec7d09> | 2013-05-29 17:05:25 +0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | kwm <kwm@058c260c-8361-11dd-a0ac-aa2bafec7d09> | 2013-05-29 17:05:25 +0800 |
commit | 5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543 (patch) | |
tree | 07efd5355b8a78f570d8df84fe36e49ba069f1c3 | |
parent | 7912cdd3ca785c02850f99e63fd3ee3f19241bed (diff) | |
download | xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.tar xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.tar.gz xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.tar.bz2 xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.tar.lz xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.tar.xz xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.tar.zst xorg-devel-ports-5f188f94fd6c76de101516edbed7adc637ee7543.zip |
Add CVE patches from upstream.
Security: CVE-2013-1984 CVE-2013-1998 CVE-2013-1995
git-svn-id: https://trillian.chruetertee.ch/svn/ports/trunk@915 058c260c-8361-11dd-a0ac-aa2bafec7d09
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/Makefile | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c | 63 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c | 61 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c | 113 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c | 126 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c | 94 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c | 52 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c | 85 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c | 83 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c | 63 |
12 files changed, 821 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/x11/libXi/Makefile b/x11/libXi/Makefile index b36c6f4..81b6652 100644 --- a/x11/libXi/Makefile +++ b/x11/libXi/Makefile @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ PORTNAME= libXi PORTVERSION= 1.7.1 +PORTREVISION= 1 PORTEPOCH= 1 CATEGORIES= x11 diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4902168 --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From bb922ed4253b35590f0369f32a917ff89ade0830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XGetDeviceMotionEvents() [CVE-2013-1984 4/8] + +If the number of events or axes reported by the server is large enough +that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, +then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the +X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XGMotion.c b/src/XGMotion.c +index 5feac85..a4c75b6 100644 +--- src/XGMotion.c ++++ src/XGMotion.c +@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SOFTWARE. + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + XDeviceTimeCoord * + XGetDeviceMotionEvents( +@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents( + xGetDeviceMotionEventsReply rep; + XDeviceTimeCoord *tc; + int *data, *bufp, *readp, *savp; +- long size, size2; ++ unsigned long size; + int i, j; + XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy); + +@@ -104,10 +105,21 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents( + SyncHandle(); + return (NULL); + } +- size = rep.length << 2; +- size2 = rep.nEvents * (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (rep.axes * sizeof(int))); +- savp = readp = (int *)Xmalloc(size); +- bufp = (int *)Xmalloc(size2); ++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { ++ size = rep.length << 2; ++ savp = readp = Xmalloc(size); ++ } else { ++ size = 0; ++ savp = readp = NULL; ++ } ++ /* rep.axes is a CARD8, so assume max number of axes for bounds check */ ++ if (rep.nEvents < ++ (INT_MAX / (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (UCHAR_MAX * sizeof(int))))) { ++ size_t bsize = rep.nEvents * ++ (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (rep.axes * sizeof(int))); ++ bufp = Xmalloc(bsize); ++ } else ++ bufp = NULL; + if (!bufp || !savp) { + Xfree(bufp); + Xfree(savp); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d395088 --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From f3e08e4fbe40016484ba795feecf1a742170ffc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:26:52 +0000 +Subject: Stack buffer overflow in XGetDeviceButtonMapping() [CVE-2013-1998 1/3] + +We copy the entire reply sent by the server into the fixed size +mapping[] array on the stack, even if the server says it's a larger +size than the mapping array can hold. HULK SMASH STACK! + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XGetBMap.c b/src/XGetBMap.c +index 211c9ca..002daba 100644 +--- src/XGetBMap.c ++++ src/XGetBMap.c +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE. + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + #ifdef MIN /* some systems define this in <sys/param.h> */ + #undef MIN +@@ -75,7 +76,6 @@ XGetDeviceButtonMapping( + { + int status = 0; + unsigned char mapping[256]; /* known fixed size */ +- long nbytes; + XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy); + + register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req; +@@ -92,13 +92,18 @@ XGetDeviceButtonMapping( + + status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse); + if (status == 1) { +- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2; +- _XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes); +- +- /* don't return more data than the user asked for. */ +- if (rep.nElts) +- memcpy((char *)map, (char *)mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap)); +- status = rep.nElts; ++ if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2)) { ++ unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2; ++ _XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes); ++ ++ /* don't return more data than the user asked for. */ ++ if (rep.nElts) ++ memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap)); ++ status = rep.nElts; ++ } else { ++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); ++ status = 0; ++ } + } else + status = 0; + UnlockDisplay(dpy); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d93276c --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From b0b13c12a8079a5a0e7f43b2b8983699057b2cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XGetDeviceControl() [CVE-2013-1984 1/8] + +If the number of valuators reported by the server is large enough that +it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then +memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the X server +reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. + +v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so +we don't read out of bounds either + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XGetDCtl.c b/src/XGetDCtl.c +index f73a4e8..51ed0ae 100644 +--- src/XGetDCtl.c ++++ src/XGetDCtl.c +@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SOFTWARE. + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + XDeviceControl * + XGetDeviceControl( +@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ XGetDeviceControl( + XDevice *dev, + int control) + { +- int size = 0; +- int nbytes, i; + XDeviceControl *Device = NULL; + XDeviceControl *Sav = NULL; + xDeviceState *d = NULL; +@@ -92,8 +91,12 @@ XGetDeviceControl( + goto out; + + if (rep.length > 0) { +- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2; +- d = (xDeviceState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes); ++ unsigned long nbytes; ++ size_t size = 0; ++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { ++ nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2; ++ d = Xmalloc(nbytes); ++ } + if (!d) { + _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); + goto out; +@@ -111,33 +114,46 @@ XGetDeviceControl( + case DEVICE_RESOLUTION: + { + xDeviceResolutionState *r; ++ size_t val_size; + + r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d; +- size += sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState) + +- (3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators); ++ if (r->num_valuators >= (INT_MAX / (3 * sizeof(int)))) ++ goto out; ++ val_size = 3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators; ++ if ((sizeof(xDeviceResolutionState) + val_size) > nbytes) ++ goto out; ++ size += sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState) + val_size; + break; + } + case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB: + { ++ if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsCalibState) > nbytes) ++ goto out; + size += sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState); + break; + } + case DEVICE_ABS_AREA: + { ++ if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsAreaState) > nbytes) ++ goto out; + size += sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState); + break; + } + case DEVICE_CORE: + { ++ if (sizeof(xDeviceCoreState) > nbytes) ++ goto out; + size += sizeof(XDeviceCoreState); + break; + } + default: ++ if (d->length > nbytes) ++ goto out; + size += d->length; + break; + } + +- Device = (XDeviceControl *) Xmalloc((unsigned)size); ++ Device = Xmalloc(size); + if (!Device) + goto out; + +@@ -150,6 +166,7 @@ XGetDeviceControl( + int *iptr, *iptr2; + xDeviceResolutionState *r; + XDeviceResolutionState *R; ++ unsigned int i; + + r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d; + R = (XDeviceResolutionState *) Device; +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a09030a --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +From 17071c1c608247800b2ca03a35b1fcc9c4cabe6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 20:30:55 +0000 +Subject: Avoid integer overflow in XGetDeviceProperties() [CVE-2013-1984 7/8] + +If the number of items as reported by the Xserver is too large, it +could overflow the calculation for the size of the buffer to copy the +reply into, causing memory corruption. + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +--- src/XGetDProp.c.orig 2010-09-07 05:21:05.000000000 +0000 ++++ src/XGetDProp.c 2013-05-29 08:56:54.000000000 +0000 +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ in this Software without prior written a + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + int + XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev, +@@ -48,7 +49,8 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice + { + xGetDevicePropertyReq *req; + xGetDevicePropertyReply rep; +- long nbytes, rbytes; ++ unsigned long nbytes, rbytes; ++ int ret = Success; + + XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy); + +@@ -81,30 +83,43 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice + * data, but this last byte is null terminated and convenient for + * returning string properties, so the client doesn't then have to + * recopy the string to make it null terminated. ++ * ++ * Maximum item limits are set to both prevent integer overflow when ++ * calculating the amount of memory to malloc, and to limit how much ++ * memory will be used if a server provides an insanely high count. + */ + switch (rep.format) { + case 8: +- nbytes = rep.nItems; +- rbytes = rep.nItems + 1; +- if (rbytes > 0 && +- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes))) +- _XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes); ++ if (rep.nItems < INT_MAX) { ++ nbytes = rep.nItems; ++ rbytes = rep.nItems + 1; ++ if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes))) ++ _XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes); ++ else ++ ret = BadAlloc; ++ } + break; + + case 16: +- nbytes = rep.nItems << 1; +- rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1; +- if (rbytes > 0 && +- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes))) +- _XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes); ++ if (rep.nItems < (INT_MAX / sizeof (short))) { ++ nbytes = rep.nItems << 1; ++ rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1; ++ if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes))) ++ _XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes); ++ else ++ ret = BadAlloc; ++ } + break; + + case 32: +- nbytes = rep.nItems << 2; +- rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1; +- if (rbytes > 0 && +- (*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes))) +- _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes); ++ if (rep.nItems < (INT_MAX / sizeof (long))) { ++ nbytes = rep.nItems << 2; ++ rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1; ++ if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes))) ++ _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes); ++ else ++ ret = BadAlloc; ++ } + break; + + default: +@@ -112,17 +127,13 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice + * This part of the code should never be reached. If it is, + * the server sent back a property with an invalid format. + */ +- nbytes = rep.length << 2; +- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes); +- UnlockDisplay(dpy); +- SyncHandle(); +- return(BadImplementation); ++ ret = BadImplementation; + } + if (! *prop) { +- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes); +- UnlockDisplay(dpy); +- SyncHandle(); +- return(BadAlloc); ++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.lenght); ++ if (ret == Success) ++ ret = BadAlloc; ++ goto out; + } + (*prop)[rbytes - 1] = '\0'; + } +@@ -131,9 +142,10 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice + *actual_format = rep.format; + *nitems = rep.nItems; + *bytes_after = rep.bytesAfter; ++ out: + UnlockDisplay (dpy); + SyncHandle (); + +- return Success; ++ return ret; + } + diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c9949b --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 322ee3576789380222d4403366e4fd12fb24cb6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XGetFeedbackControl() [CVE-2013-1984 2/8] + +If the number of feedbacks reported by the server is large enough that +it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, or +if the total size of all the feedback structures overflows when added +together, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from +the X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. + +v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so + we don't read out of bounds either + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XGetFCtl.c b/src/XGetFCtl.c +index 28fab4d..bb50bf3 100644 +--- src/XGetFCtl.c ++++ src/XGetFCtl.c +@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SOFTWARE. + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + XFeedbackState * + XGetFeedbackControl( +@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ XGetFeedbackControl( + XDevice *dev, + int *num_feedbacks) + { +- int size = 0; +- int nbytes, i; + XFeedbackState *Feedback = NULL; + XFeedbackState *Sav = NULL; + xFeedbackState *f = NULL; +@@ -91,9 +90,16 @@ XGetFeedbackControl( + goto out; + + if (rep.length > 0) { ++ unsigned long nbytes; ++ size_t size = 0; ++ int i; ++ + *num_feedbacks = rep.num_feedbacks; +- nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2; +- f = (xFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes); ++ ++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { ++ nbytes = rep.length << 2; ++ f = Xmalloc(nbytes); ++ } + if (!f) { + _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); + goto out; +@@ -102,6 +108,10 @@ XGetFeedbackControl( + _XRead(dpy, (char *)f, nbytes); + + for (i = 0; i < *num_feedbacks; i++) { ++ if (f->length > nbytes) ++ goto out; ++ nbytes -= f->length; ++ + switch (f->class) { + case KbdFeedbackClass: + size += sizeof(XKbdFeedbackState); +@@ -116,6 +126,8 @@ XGetFeedbackControl( + { + xStringFeedbackState *strf = (xStringFeedbackState *) f; + ++ if (strf->num_syms_supported >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(KeySym))) ++ goto out; + size += sizeof(XStringFeedbackState) + + (strf->num_syms_supported * sizeof(KeySym)); + } +@@ -130,10 +142,12 @@ XGetFeedbackControl( + size += f->length; + break; + } ++ if (size > INT_MAX) ++ goto out; + f = (xFeedbackState *) ((char *)f + f->length); + } + +- Feedback = (XFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)size); ++ Feedback = Xmalloc(size); + if (!Feedback) + goto out; + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8574a3e --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 6dd6dc51a2935c72774be81e5cc2ba2c30e9feff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XGetDeviceDontPropagateList() [CVE-2013-1984 3/8] + +If the number of event classes reported by the server is large enough +that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, +then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the +X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. + +V2: EatData if count is 0 but length is > 0 to avoid XIOErrors + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +(limited to 'src/XGetProp.c') + +--- src/XGetProp.c.orig 2011-12-20 00:28:44.000000000 +0000 ++++ src/XGetProp.c 2013-05-29 09:01:49.000000000 +0000 +@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE. + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + XEventClass * + XGetDeviceDontPropagateList( +@@ -89,11 +90,11 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList( + } + *count = rep.count; + +- if (*count) { +- rlen = rep.length << 2; +- list = (XEventClass *) Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass)); ++ if (rep.length != 0) { ++ if ((rep.count != 0) && (rep.length < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XEventClass)))) ++ list = Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass)); + if (list) { +- int i; ++ unsigned int i; + CARD32 ec; + + /* read and assign each XEventClass separately because +@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList( + list[i] = (XEventClass) ec; + } + } else +- _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen); ++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.lenght); + } + + UnlockDisplay(dpy); diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b41d9f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 91434737f592e8f5cc1762383882a582b55fc03a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 07:37:23 +0000 +Subject: memory corruption in _XIPassiveGrabDevice() [CVE-2013-1998 2/3] + +If the server returned more modifiers than the caller asked for, +we'd just keep copying past the end of the array provided by the +caller, writing over who-knows-what happened to be there. + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XIPassiveGrab.c b/src/XIPassiveGrab.c +index ac17c01..53b4084 100644 +--- src/XIPassiveGrab.c ++++ src/XIPassiveGrab.c +@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ _XIPassiveGrabDevice(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int grabtype, int detail, + return -1; + _XRead(dpy, (char*)failed_mods, reply.num_modifiers * sizeof(xXIGrabModifierInfo)); + +- for (i = 0; i < reply.num_modifiers; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < reply.num_modifiers && i < num_modifiers; i++) + { + modifiers_inout[i].status = failed_mods[i].status; + modifiers_inout[i].modifiers = failed_mods[i].modifiers; +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d62f19 --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 242f92b490a695fbab244af5bad11b71f897c732 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XIGetProperty() [CVE-2013-1984 5/8] + +If the number of items reported by the server is large enough that +it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate item type, +then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the +X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them. + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XIProperties.c b/src/XIProperties.c +index 5e58fb6..32436d1 100644 +--- src/XIProperties.c ++++ src/XIProperties.c +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ + #include <X11/extensions/XInput2.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + Atom* + XIListProperties(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int *num_props_return) +@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset, + { + xXIGetPropertyReq *req; + xXIGetPropertyReply rep; +- long nbytes, rbytes; ++ unsigned long nbytes, rbytes; + + XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy); + +@@ -216,9 +217,11 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset, + * recopy the string to make it null terminated. + */ + +- nbytes = rep.num_items * rep.format/8; +- rbytes = nbytes + 1; +- *data = Xmalloc(rbytes); ++ if (rep.num_items < (INT_MAX / (rep.format/8))) { ++ nbytes = rep.num_items * rep.format/8; ++ rbytes = nbytes + 1; ++ *data = Xmalloc(rbytes); ++ } + + if (!(*data)) { + _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c86656f --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 528419b9ef437e7eeafb41bf45e8ff7d818bd845 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000 +Subject: integer overflow in XIGetSelectedEvents() [CVE-2013-1984 6/8] + +If the number of events or masks reported by the server is large enough +that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, +or the sizes overflow as they are totaled up, then memory corruption can +occur when more bytes are copied from the X server reply than the size +of the buffer we allocated to hold them. + +v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, + so that we don't read out of bounds either + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XISelEv.c b/src/XISelEv.c +index f871222..0471bef 100644 +--- src/XISelEv.c ++++ src/XISelEv.c +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from the author. + #include <X11/extensions/ge.h> + #include <X11/extensions/geproto.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + int + XISelectEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, XIEventMask* masks, int num_masks) +@@ -101,13 +102,14 @@ out: + XIEventMask* + XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return) + { +- int i, len = 0; ++ unsigned int i, len = 0; + unsigned char *mask; + XIEventMask *mask_out = NULL; + xXIEventMask *mask_in = NULL, *mi; + xXIGetSelectedEventsReq *req; + xXIGetSelectedEventsReply reply; + XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy); ++ size_t rbytes; + + *num_masks_return = -1; + LockDisplay(dpy); +@@ -129,11 +131,16 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return) + goto out; + } + +- mask_in = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4); +- if (!mask_in) ++ if (reply.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { ++ rbytes = (unsigned long) reply.length << 2; ++ mask_in = Xmalloc(rbytes); ++ } ++ if (!mask_in) { ++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, reply.length); + goto out; ++ } + +- _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, reply.length * 4); ++ _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, rbytes); + + /* + * This function takes interleaved xXIEventMask structs & masks off +@@ -148,8 +155,14 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return) + + for (i = 0, mi = mask_in; i < reply.num_masks; i++) + { +- len += mi->mask_len * 4; +- mi = (xXIEventMask*)((char*)mi + mi->mask_len * 4); ++ unsigned int mask_bytes = mi->mask_len * 4; ++ len += mask_bytes; ++ if (len > INT_MAX) ++ goto out; ++ if ((sizeof(xXIEventMask) + mask_bytes) > rbytes) ++ goto out; ++ rbytes -= (sizeof(xXIEventMask) + mask_bytes); ++ mi = (xXIEventMask*)((char*)mi + mask_bytes); + mi++; + } + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8231e6b --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +From 81b4df8ac6aa1520c41c3526961014a6f115cc46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 08:16:22 +0000 +Subject: sign extension issue in XListInputDevices() [CVE-2013-1995] + +nptr is (signed) char, which can be negative, and will sign extend +when added to the int size, which means size can be subtracted from, +leading to allocating too small a buffer to hold the data being copied +from the X server's reply. + +v2: check that string size fits inside the data read from the server, + so that we don't read out of bounds either + +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XListDev.c b/src/XListDev.c +index 1c14b96..b85ff3c 100644 +--- src/XListDev.c ++++ src/XListDev.c +@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int pad_to_xid(int base_size) + return ((base_size + padsize - 1)/padsize) * padsize; + } + +-static int ++static size_t + SizeClassInfo(xAnyClassPtr *any, int num_classes) + { + int size = 0; +@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ XListInputDevices( + register Display *dpy, + int *ndevices) + { +- int size; ++ size_t size; + xListInputDevicesReq *req; + xListInputDevicesReply rep; + xDeviceInfo *list, *slist = NULL; +@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ XListInputDevices( + XDeviceInfo *clist = NULL; + xAnyClassPtr any, sav_any; + XAnyClassPtr Any; +- char *nptr, *Nptr; ++ unsigned char *nptr, *Nptr; + int i; + unsigned long rlen; + XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy); +@@ -217,9 +217,12 @@ XListInputDevices( + size += SizeClassInfo(&any, (int)list->num_classes); + } + +- for (i = 0, nptr = (char *)any; i < *ndevices; i++) { ++ Nptr = ((unsigned char *)list) + rlen + 1; ++ for (i = 0, nptr = (unsigned char *)any; i < *ndevices; i++) { + size += *nptr + 1; + nptr += (*nptr + 1); ++ if (nptr > Nptr) ++ goto out; + } + + clist = (XDeviceInfoPtr) Xmalloc(size); +@@ -245,8 +248,8 @@ XListInputDevices( + } + + clist = sclist; +- nptr = (char *)any; +- Nptr = (char *)Any; ++ nptr = (unsigned char *)any; ++ Nptr = (unsigned char *)Any; + for (i = 0; i < *ndevices; i++, clist++) { + clist->name = (char *)Nptr; + memcpy(Nptr, nptr + 1, *nptr); +@@ -256,6 +259,7 @@ XListInputDevices( + } + } + ++ out: + XFree((char *)slist); + UnlockDisplay(dpy); + SyncHandle(); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23e60c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 5398ac0797f7516f2c9b8f2869a6c6d071437352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2013 05:48:36 +0000 +Subject: unvalidated lengths in XQueryDeviceState() [CVE-2013-1998 3/3] + +If the lengths given for each class state in the reply add up to more +than the rep.length, we could read past the end of the buffer allocated +to hold the data read from the server. + +Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> +--- +diff --git a/src/XQueryDv.c b/src/XQueryDv.c +index 69c285b..3836777 100644 +--- src/XQueryDv.c ++++ src/XQueryDv.c +@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SOFTWARE. + #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h> + #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h> + #include "XIint.h" ++#include <limits.h> + + XDeviceState * + XQueryDeviceState( +@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ XQueryDeviceState( + XDevice *dev) + { + int i, j; +- int rlen; +- int size = 0; ++ unsigned long rlen; ++ size_t size = 0; + xQueryDeviceStateReq *req; + xQueryDeviceStateReply rep; + XDeviceState *state = NULL; +@@ -87,9 +88,11 @@ XQueryDeviceState( + if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse)) + goto out; + +- rlen = rep.length << 2; +- if (rlen > 0) { +- data = Xmalloc(rlen); ++ if (rep.length > 0) { ++ if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) { ++ rlen = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2; ++ data = Xmalloc(rlen); ++ } + if (!data) { + _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length); + goto out; +@@ -97,6 +100,10 @@ XQueryDeviceState( + _XRead(dpy, data, rlen); + + for (i = 0, any = (XInputClass *) data; i < (int)rep.num_classes; i++) { ++ if (any->length > rlen) ++ goto out; ++ rlen -= any->length; ++ + switch (any->class) { + case KeyClass: + size += sizeof(XKeyState); +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe |