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| author | Jeffrey Stedfast <fejj@ximian.com> | 2003-03-13 05:39:09 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jeffrey Stedfast <fejj@src.gnome.org> | 2003-03-13 05:39:09 +0800 |
| commit | 4b32de61d00bf5ae12d4179bede135fd2ded0f9c (patch) | |
| tree | 92debe525bfb370732bd8d56328ca461203a2a3f /mail/ChangeLog | |
| parent | 1f54deb5584629a657a69d62db0e07935322be05 (diff) | |
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Security vulnerability fixes.
2003-03-12 Jeffrey Stedfast <fejj@ximian.com>
Security vulnerability fixes.
* mail-display.c (do_external_viewer): Make sure that we don't
launch a bonobo control to view a mime-type that we handle
internally, otherwise maliciously formed HTML mail using <object>
tags could potentially launch a bonobo vontrol to view the mime
part bypassing any checks that Evolution might do on the data
normally.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=20269
Diffstat (limited to 'mail/ChangeLog')
| -rw-r--r-- | mail/ChangeLog | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/mail/ChangeLog b/mail/ChangeLog index 7b553f817e..a8be5524cc 100644 --- a/mail/ChangeLog +++ b/mail/ChangeLog @@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ Security vulnerability fixes. + * mail-display.c (do_external_viewer): Make sure that we don't + launch a bonobo control to view a mime-type that we handle + internally, otherwise maliciously formed HTML mail using <object> + tags could potentially launch a bonobo vontrol to view the mime + part bypassing any checks that Evolution might do on the data + normally. + * mail-format.c (handle_text_html, attachment_header) (handle_image, handle_via_bonobo): Encode the result from get_cid() so that malicious Content-Id strings cannot bypass the |