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authorWei-Ning Huang <w@dexon.org>2019-04-18 14:15:11 +0800
committerJimmy Hu <jimmy.hu@dexon.org>2019-04-18 14:15:11 +0800
commitac3378ba084e1fbf25c11581c224009a3cf75062 (patch)
treec384c056df0a28bfd9dd47864daa03b24fb78ce8 /crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
parent9abba1d1a25b47a21666b6abfc30a3ce4ff88ed6 (diff)
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crypto: use go-ethereum secp256k1 package to avoid symbol conflict (#374)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h')
-rw-r--r--crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h210
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 210 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h b/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 35f254607..000000000
--- a/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-/**********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- **********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H_
-#define _SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H_
-
-#include "scalar.h"
-#include "group.h"
-#include "ecmult_gen.h"
-#include "hash_impl.h"
-#ifdef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
-#include "ecmult_static_context.h"
-#endif
-static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) {
- ctx->prec = NULL;
-}
-
-static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const secp256k1_callback* cb) {
-#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
- secp256k1_ge prec[1024];
- secp256k1_gej gj;
- secp256k1_gej nums_gej;
- int i, j;
-#endif
-
- if (ctx->prec != NULL) {
- return;
- }
-#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
- ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(*ctx->prec));
-
- /* get the generator */
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gj, &secp256k1_ge_const_g);
-
- /* Construct a group element with no known corresponding scalar (nothing up my sleeve). */
- {
- static const unsigned char nums_b32[33] = "The scalar for this x is unknown";
- secp256k1_fe nums_x;
- secp256k1_ge nums_ge;
- int r;
- r = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&nums_x, nums_b32);
- (void)r;
- VERIFY_CHECK(r);
- r = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&nums_ge, &nums_x, 0);
- (void)r;
- VERIFY_CHECK(r);
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&nums_gej, &nums_ge);
- /* Add G to make the bits in x uniformly distributed. */
- secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&nums_gej, &nums_gej, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, NULL);
- }
-
- /* compute prec. */
- {
- secp256k1_gej precj[1024]; /* Jacobian versions of prec. */
- secp256k1_gej gbase;
- secp256k1_gej numsbase;
- gbase = gj; /* 16^j * G */
- numsbase = nums_gej; /* 2^j * nums. */
- for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
- /* Set precj[j*16 .. j*16+15] to (numsbase, numsbase + gbase, ..., numsbase + 15*gbase). */
- precj[j*16] = numsbase;
- for (i = 1; i < 16; i++) {
- secp256k1_gej_add_var(&precj[j*16 + i], &precj[j*16 + i - 1], &gbase, NULL);
- }
- /* Multiply gbase by 16. */
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- secp256k1_gej_double_var(&gbase, &gbase, NULL);
- }
- /* Multiply numbase by 2. */
- secp256k1_gej_double_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, NULL);
- if (j == 62) {
- /* In the last iteration, numsbase is (1 - 2^j) * nums instead. */
- secp256k1_gej_neg(&numsbase, &numsbase);
- secp256k1_gej_add_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, &nums_gej, NULL);
- }
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(prec, precj, 1024, cb);
- }
- for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&(*ctx->prec)[j][i], &prec[j*16 + i]);
- }
- }
-#else
- (void)cb;
- ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])secp256k1_ecmult_static_context;
-#endif
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(ctx, NULL);
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx) {
- return ctx->prec != NULL;
-}
-
-static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clone(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst,
- const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *src, const secp256k1_callback* cb) {
- if (src->prec == NULL) {
- dst->prec = NULL;
- } else {
-#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
- dst->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[64][16])checked_malloc(cb, sizeof(*dst->prec));
- memcpy(dst->prec, src->prec, sizeof(*dst->prec));
-#else
- (void)cb;
- dst->prec = src->prec;
-#endif
- dst->initial = src->initial;
- dst->blind = src->blind;
- }
-}
-
-static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) {
-#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
- free(ctx->prec);
-#endif
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ctx->blind);
- secp256k1_gej_clear(&ctx->initial);
- ctx->prec = NULL;
-}
-
-static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *gn) {
- secp256k1_ge add;
- secp256k1_ge_storage adds;
- secp256k1_scalar gnb;
- int bits;
- int i, j;
- memset(&adds, 0, sizeof(adds));
- *r = ctx->initial;
- /* Blind scalar/point multiplication by computing (n-b)G + bG instead of nG. */
- secp256k1_scalar_add(&gnb, gn, &ctx->blind);
- add.infinity = 0;
- for (j = 0; j < 64; j++) {
- bits = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&gnb, j * 4, 4);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
- /** This uses a conditional move to avoid any secret data in array indexes.
- * _Any_ use of secret indexes has been demonstrated to result in timing
- * sidechannels, even when the cache-line access patterns are uniform.
- * See also:
- * "A word of warning", CHES 2013 Rump Session, by Daniel J. Bernstein and Peter Schwabe
- * (https://cryptojedi.org/peter/data/chesrump-20130822.pdf) and
- * "Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: the Case of AES", RSA 2006,
- * by Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer
- * (http://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/cache.pdf)
- */
- secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&adds, &(*ctx->prec)[j][i], i == bits);
- }
- secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&add, &adds);
- secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &add);
- }
- bits = 0;
- secp256k1_ge_clear(&add);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&gnb);
-}
-
-/* Setup blinding values for secp256k1_ecmult_gen. */
-static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32) {
- secp256k1_scalar b;
- secp256k1_gej gb;
- secp256k1_fe s;
- unsigned char nonce32[32];
- secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_t rng;
- int retry;
- unsigned char keydata[64] = {0};
- if (seed32 == NULL) {
- /* When seed is NULL, reset the initial point and blinding value. */
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ctx->initial, &secp256k1_ge_const_g);
- secp256k1_gej_neg(&ctx->initial, &ctx->initial);
- secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ctx->blind, 1);
- }
- /* The prior blinding value (if not reset) is chained forward by including it in the hash. */
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &ctx->blind);
- /** Using a CSPRNG allows a failure free interface, avoids needing large amounts of random data,
- * and guards against weak or adversarial seeds. This is a simpler and safer interface than
- * asking the caller for blinding values directly and expecting them to retry on failure.
- */
- memcpy(keydata, nonce32, 32);
- if (seed32 != NULL) {
- memcpy(keydata + 32, seed32, 32);
- }
- secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, seed32 ? 64 : 32);
- memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata));
- /* Retry for out of range results to achieve uniformity. */
- do {
- secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32);
- retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32);
- retry |= secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s);
- } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */
- /* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */
- secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s);
- secp256k1_fe_clear(&s);
- do {
- secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32);
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry);
- /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */
- retry |= secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b);
- } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */
- secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng);
- memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &gb, &b);
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&b, &b);
- ctx->blind = b;
- ctx->initial = gb;
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&b);
- secp256k1_gej_clear(&gb);
-}
-
-#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-03-07 12:59:04 +0800