crypto: use go-ethereum secp256k1 package to avoid symbol conflict (#374)

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 577 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h b/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f268e309d..000000000
--- a/crypto/secp256k1/libsecp256k1/include/secp256k1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,577 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_
-# define _SECP256K1_
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-# endif
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-
-/* These rules specify the order of arguments in API calls:
- *
- * 1. Context pointers go first, followed by output arguments, combined
- *    output/input arguments, and finally input-only arguments.
- * 2. Array lengths always immediately the follow the argument whose length
- *    they describe, even if this violates rule 1.
- * 3. Within the OUT/OUTIN/IN groups, pointers to data that is typically generated
- *    later go first. This means: signatures, public nonces, private nonces,
- *    messages, public keys, secret keys, tweaks.
- * 4. Arguments that are not data pointers go last, from more complex to less
- *    complex: function pointers, algorithm names, messages, void pointers,
- *    counts, flags, booleans.
- * 5. Opaque data pointers follow the function pointer they are to be passed to.
- */
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds context information (precomputed tables etc.).
- *
- *  The purpose of context structures is to cache large precomputed data tables
- *  that are expensive to construct, and also to maintain the randomization data
- *  for blinding.
- *
- *  Do not create a new context object for each operation, as construction is
- *  far slower than all other API calls (~100 times slower than an ECDSA
- *  verification).
- *
- *  A constructed context can safely be used from multiple threads
- *  simultaneously, but API call that take a non-const pointer to a context
- *  need exclusive access to it. In particular this is the case for
- *  secp256k1_context_destroy and secp256k1_context_randomize.
- *
- *  Regarding randomization, either do it once at creation time (in which case
- *  you do not need any locking for the other calls), or use a read-write lock.
- */
-typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context;
-
-/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or
- *  comparison, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse.
- */
-typedef struct {
-    unsigned char data[64];
-} secp256k1_pubkey;
-
-/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
- *  guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
- *  however guaranteed to be 64 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
- *  If you need to convert to a format suitable for storage, transmission, or
- *  comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and
- *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* functions.
- */
-typedef struct {
-    unsigned char data[64];
-} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature;
-
-/** A pointer to a function to deterministically generate a nonce.
- *
- * Returns: 1 if a nonce was successfully generated. 0 will cause signing to fail.
- * Out:     nonce32:   pointer to a 32-byte array to be filled by the function.
- * In:      msg32:     the 32-byte message hash being verified (will not be NULL)
- *          key32:     pointer to a 32-byte secret key (will not be NULL)
- *          algo16:    pointer to a 16-byte array describing the signature
- *                     algorithm (will be NULL for ECDSA for compatibility).
- *          data:      Arbitrary data pointer that is passed through.
- *          attempt:   how many iterations we have tried to find a nonce.
- *                     This will almost always be 0, but different attempt values
- *                     are required to result in a different nonce.
- *
- * Except for test cases, this function should compute some cryptographic hash of
- * the message, the algorithm, the key and the attempt.
- */
-typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(
-    unsigned char *nonce32,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const unsigned char *key32,
-    const unsigned char *algo16,
-    void *data,
-    unsigned int attempt
-);
-
-# if !defined(SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ)
-#  if defined(__GNUC__)&&defined(__GNUC_MINOR__)
-#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) \
- ((__GNUC__<<16)+__GNUC_MINOR__>=((_maj)<<16)+(_min))
-#  else
-#   define SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(_maj,_min) 0
-#  endif
-# endif
-
-# if (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || (__STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L) )
-#  if SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(2,7)
-#   define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline__
-#  elif (defined(_MSC_VER))
-#   define SECP256K1_INLINE __inline
-#  else
-#   define SECP256K1_INLINE
-#  endif
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_INLINE inline
-# endif
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_API
-# if defined(_WIN32)
-#  ifdef SECP256K1_BUILD
-#   define SECP256K1_API __declspec(dllexport)
-#  else
-#   define SECP256K1_API
-#  endif
-# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
-#  define SECP256K1_API __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_API
-# endif
-#endif
-
-/**Warning attributes
-  * NONNULL is not used if SECP256K1_BUILD is set to avoid the compiler optimizing out
-  * some paranoid null checks. */
-# if defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
-#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__ ((__warn_unused_result__))
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT
-# endif
-# if !defined(SECP256K1_BUILD) && defined(__GNUC__) && SECP256K1_GNUC_PREREQ(3, 4)
-#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)  __attribute__ ((__nonnull__(_x)))
-# else
-#  define SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(_x)
-# endif
-
-/** All flags' lower 8 bits indicate what they're for. Do not use directly. */
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_MASK ((1 << 8) - 1)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT (1 << 0)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION (1 << 1)
-/** The higher bits contain the actual data. Do not use directly. */
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY (1 << 8)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN (1 << 9)
-#define SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION (1 << 8)
-
-/** Flags to pass to secp256k1_context_create. */
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_VERIFY)
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_CONTEXT_SIGN)
-#define SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_CONTEXT)
-
-/** Flag to pass to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export. */
-#define SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION | SECP256K1_FLAGS_BIT_COMPRESSION)
-#define SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED (SECP256K1_FLAGS_TYPE_COMPRESSION)
-
-/** Create a secp256k1 context object.
- *
- *  Returns: a newly created context object.
- *  In:      flags: which parts of the context to initialize.
- */
-SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_create(
-    unsigned int flags
-) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Copies a secp256k1 context object.
- *
- *  Returns: a newly created context object.
- *  Args:    ctx: an existing context to copy (cannot be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API secp256k1_context* secp256k1_context_clone(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT;
-
-/** Destroy a secp256k1 context object.
- *
- *  The context pointer may not be used afterwards.
- *  Args:   ctx: an existing context to destroy (cannot be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_destroy(
-    secp256k1_context* ctx
-);
-
-/** Set a callback function to be called when an illegal argument is passed to
- *  an API call. It will only trigger for violations that are mentioned
- *  explicitly in the header.
- *
- *  The philosophy is that these shouldn't be dealt with through a
- *  specific return value, as calling code should not have branches to deal with
- *  the case that this code itself is broken.
- *
- *  On the other hand, during debug stage, one would want to be informed about
- *  such mistakes, and the default (crashing) may be inadvisable.
- *  When this callback is triggered, the API function called is guaranteed not
- *  to cause a crash, though its return value and output arguments are
- *  undefined.
- *
- *  Args: ctx:  an existing context object (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:   fun:  a pointer to a function to call when an illegal argument is
- *              passed to the API, taking a message and an opaque pointer
- *              (NULL restores a default handler that calls abort).
- *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above.
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(
-    secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data),
-    const void* data
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Set a callback function to be called when an internal consistency check
- *  fails. The default is crashing.
- *
- *  This can only trigger in case of a hardware failure, miscompilation,
- *  memory corruption, serious bug in the library, or other error would can
- *  otherwise result in undefined behaviour. It will not trigger due to mere
- *  incorrect usage of the API (see secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback
- *  for that). After this callback returns, anything may happen, including
- *  crashing.
- *
- *  Args: ctx:  an existing context object (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:   fun:  a pointer to a function to call when an internal error occurs,
- *              taking a message and an opaque pointer (NULL restores a default
- *              handler that calls abort).
- *        data: the opaque pointer to pass to fun above.
- */
-SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(
-    secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    void (*fun)(const char* message, void* data),
-    const void* data
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.
- *           0 if the public key could not be parsed or is invalid.
- *  Args: ctx:      a secp256k1 context object.
- *  Out:  pubkey:   pointer to a pubkey object. If 1 is returned, it is set to a
- *                  parsed version of input. If not, its value is undefined.
- *  In:   input:    pointer to a serialized public key
- *        inputlen: length of the array pointed to by input
- *
- *  This function supports parsing compressed (33 bytes, header byte 0x02 or
- *  0x03), uncompressed (65 bytes, header byte 0x04), or hybrid (65 bytes, header
- *  byte 0x06 or 0x07) format public keys.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *input,
-    size_t inputlen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize a pubkey object into a serialized byte sequence.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 always.
- *  Args:   ctx:        a secp256k1 context object.
- *  Out:    output:     a pointer to a 65-byte (if compressed==0) or 33-byte (if
- *                      compressed==1) byte array to place the serialized key
- *                      in.
- *  In/Out: outputlen:  a pointer to an integer which is initially set to the
- *                      size of output, and is overwritten with the written
- *                      size.
- *  In:     pubkey:     a pointer to a secp256k1_pubkey containing an
- *                      initialized public key.
- *          flags:      SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED if serialization should be in
- *                      compressed format, otherwise SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *output,
-    size_t *outputlen,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey* pubkey,
-    unsigned int flags
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Parse an ECDSA signature in compact (64 bytes) format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args: ctx:      a secp256k1 context object
- *  Out:  sig:      a pointer to a signature object
- *  In:   input64:  a pointer to the 64-byte array to parse
- *
- *  The signature must consist of a 32-byte big endian R value, followed by a
- *  32-byte big endian S value. If R or S fall outside of [0..order-1], the
- *  encoding is invalid. R and S with value 0 are allowed in the encoding.
- *
- *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or R or
- *  S are zero, the resulting sig value is guaranteed to fail validation for any
- *  message and public key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig,
-    const unsigned char *input64
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Parse a DER ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 when the signature could be parsed, 0 otherwise.
- *  Args: ctx:      a secp256k1 context object
- *  Out:  sig:      a pointer to a signature object
- *  In:   input:    a pointer to the signature to be parsed
- *        inputlen: the length of the array pointed to be input
- *
- *  This function will accept any valid DER encoded signature, even if the
- *  encoded numbers are out of range.
- *
- *  After the call, sig will always be initialized. If parsing failed or the
- *  encoded numbers are out of range, signature validation with it is
- *  guaranteed to fail for every message and public key.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig,
-    const unsigned char *input,
-    size_t inputlen
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in DER format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if enough space was available to serialize, 0 otherwise
- *  Args:   ctx:       a secp256k1 context object
- *  Out:    output:    a pointer to an array to store the DER serialization
- *  In/Out: outputlen: a pointer to a length integer. Initially, this integer
- *                     should be set to the length of output. After the call
- *                     it will be set to the length of the serialization (even
- *                     if 0 was returned).
- *  In:     sig:       a pointer to an initialized signature object
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *output,
-    size_t *outputlen,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Serialize an ECDSA signature in compact (64 byte) format.
- *
- *  Returns: 1
- *  Args:   ctx:       a secp256k1 context object
- *  Out:    output64:  a pointer to a 64-byte array to store the compact serialization
- *  In:     sig:       a pointer to an initialized signature object
- *
- *  See secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact for details about the encoding.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *output64,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature* sig
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Verify an ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: correct signature
- *           0: incorrect or unparseable signature
- *  Args:    ctx:       a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification.
- *  In:      sig:       the signature being verified (cannot be NULL)
- *           msg32:     the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL)
- *           pubkey:    pointer to an initialized public key to verify with (cannot be NULL)
- *
- * To avoid accepting malleable signatures, only ECDSA signatures in lower-S
- * form are accepted.
- *
- * If you need to accept ECDSA signatures from sources that do not obey this
- * rule, apply secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize to the signature prior to
- * validation, but be aware that doing so results in malleable signatures.
- *
- * For details, see the comments for that function.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Convert a signature to a normalized lower-S form.
- *
- *  Returns: 1 if sigin was not normalized, 0 if it already was.
- *  Args: ctx:    a secp256k1 context object
- *  Out:  sigout: a pointer to a signature to fill with the normalized form,
- *                or copy if the input was already normalized. (can be NULL if
- *                you're only interested in whether the input was already
- *                normalized).
- *  In:   sigin:  a pointer to a signature to check/normalize (cannot be NULL,
- *                can be identical to sigout)
- *
- *  With ECDSA a third-party can forge a second distinct signature of the same
- *  message, given a single initial signature, but without knowing the key. This
- *  is done by negating the S value modulo the order of the curve, 'flipping'
- *  the sign of the random point R which is not included in the signature.
- *
- *  Forgery of the same message isn't universally problematic, but in systems
- *  where message malleability or uniqueness of signatures is important this can
- *  cause issues. This forgery can be blocked by all verifiers forcing signers
- *  to use a normalized form.
- *
- *  The lower-S form reduces the size of signatures slightly on average when
- *  variable length encodings (such as DER) are used and is cheap to verify,
- *  making it a good choice. Security of always using lower-S is assured because
- *  anyone can trivially modify a signature after the fact to enforce this
- *  property anyway.
- *
- *  The lower S value is always between 0x1 and
- *  0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0,
- *  inclusive.
- *
- *  No other forms of ECDSA malleability are known and none seem likely, but
- *  there is no formal proof that ECDSA, even with this additional restriction,
- *  is free of other malleability. Commonly used serialization schemes will also
- *  accept various non-unique encodings, so care should be taken when this
- *  property is required for an application.
- *
- *  The secp256k1_ecdsa_sign function will by default create signatures in the
- *  lower-S form, and secp256k1_ecdsa_verify will not accept others. In case
- *  signatures come from a system that cannot enforce this property,
- *  secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize must be called before verification.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigout,
-    const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigin
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** An implementation of RFC6979 (using HMAC-SHA256) as nonce generation function.
- * If a data pointer is passed, it is assumed to be a pointer to 32 bytes of
- * extra entropy.
- */
-SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979;
-
-/** A default safe nonce generation function (currently equal to secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979). */
-SECP256K1_API extern const secp256k1_nonce_function secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
-
-/** Create an ECDSA signature.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: signature created
- *           0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was invalid.
- *  Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL)
- *  Out:     sig:    pointer to an array where the signature will be placed (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:      msg32:  the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL)
- *           seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL)
- *           noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL, secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used
- *           ndata:  pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation function (can be NULL)
- *
- * The created signature is always in lower-S form. See
- * secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_normalize for more details.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig,
-    const unsigned char *msg32,
-    const unsigned char *seckey,
-    secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
-    const void *ndata
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Verify an ECDSA secret key.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: secret key is valid
- *           0: secret key is invalid
- *  Args:    ctx: pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:      seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    const unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2);
-
-/** Compute the public key for a secret key.
- *
- *  Returns: 1: secret was valid, public key stores
- *           0: secret was invalid, try again
- *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object, initialized for signing (cannot be NULL)
- *  Out:    pubkey:     pointer to the created public key (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:     seckey:     pointer to a 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *seckey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Tweak a private key by adding tweak to it.
- * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
- *          uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting private key
- *          would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the
- *          private key). 1 otherwise.
- * Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL).
- * In/Out:  seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key.
- * In:      tweak:  pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Tweak a public key by adding tweak times the generator to it.
- * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
- *          uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or if the resulting public key
- *          would be invalid (only when the tweak is the complement of the
- *          corresponding private key). 1 otherwise.
- * Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object initialized for validation
- *                  (cannot be NULL).
- * In/Out:  pubkey: pointer to a public key object.
- * In:      tweak:  pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Tweak a private key by multiplying it by a tweak.
- * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
- *          uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise.
- * Args:   ctx:    pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL).
- * In/Out: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte private key.
- * In:     tweak:  pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    unsigned char *seckey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Tweak a public key by multiplying it by a tweak value.
- * Returns: 0 if the tweak was out of range (chance of around 1 in 2^128 for
- *          uniformly random 32-byte arrays, or equal to zero. 1 otherwise.
- * Args:    ctx:    pointer to a context object initialized for validation
- *                 (cannot be NULL).
- * In/Out:  pubkey: pointer to a public key obkect.
- * In:      tweak:  pointer to a 32-byte tweak.
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
-    const unsigned char *tweak
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Updates the context randomization.
- *  Returns: 1: randomization successfully updated
- *           0: error
- *  Args:    ctx:       pointer to a context object (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:      seed32:    pointer to a 32-byte random seed (NULL resets to initial state)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_context_randomize(
-    secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    const unsigned char *seed32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
-
-/** Add a number of public keys together.
- *  Returns: 1: the sum of the public keys is valid.
- *           0: the sum of the public keys is not valid.
- *  Args:   ctx:        pointer to a context object
- *  Out:    out:        pointer to a public key object for placing the resulting public key
- *                      (cannot be NULL)
- *  In:     ins:        pointer to array of pointers to public keys (cannot be NULL)
- *          n:          the number of public keys to add together (must be at least 1)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(
-    const secp256k1_context* ctx,
-    secp256k1_pubkey *out,
-    const secp256k1_pubkey * const * ins,
-    size_t n
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-# endif
-
-#endif