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author | Cosimo Cecchi <cosimoc@gnome.org> | 2010-08-13 00:46:08 +0800 |
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committer | Cosimo Cecchi <cosimoc@gnome.org> | 2010-08-13 22:22:24 +0800 |
commit | dd4b301661b2516731027eebbf3147692292d749 (patch) | |
tree | 41cda825d968173afc7f1776783abbde347a3cea /libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c | |
parent | 7472633dcbe1e50a28224960a02b8cf8f83bf422 (diff) | |
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Correctly treat the last certificate in the chain
I.e. emit SelfSigned if we don't have any trusted CAs in our cache.
Diffstat (limited to 'libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c | 43 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c b/libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c index 1ed9ede0c..f279efbfe 100644 --- a/libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c +++ b/libempathy/empathy-tls-verifier.c @@ -139,11 +139,34 @@ verify_last_certificate (EmpathyTLSVerifier *self, gnutls_x509_crt_t *trusted_ca_list; EmpathyTLSVerifierPriv *priv = GET_PRIV (self); - trusted_ca_list = ptr_array_to_x509_crt_list (priv->trusted_ca_list); - res = gnutls_x509_crt_verify (cert, trusted_ca_list, - priv->trusted_ca_list->len, 0, &verify_output); + if (priv->trusted_ca_list->len > 0) + { + trusted_ca_list = ptr_array_to_x509_crt_list (priv->trusted_ca_list); + res = gnutls_x509_crt_verify (cert, trusted_ca_list, + priv->trusted_ca_list->len, 0, &verify_output); + + DEBUG ("Checking last certificate %p against trusted CAs, output %u", + cert, verify_output); - g_free (trusted_ca_list); + g_free (trusted_ca_list); + } + else + { + /* check it against itself to see if it's structurally valid */ + res = gnutls_x509_crt_verify (cert, &cert, 1, 0, &verify_output); + + DEBUG ("Checking last certificate %p against itself, output %u", cert, + verify_output); + + /* if it's valid, return the SelfSigned error, so that we can add it + * later to our trusted CAs whitelist. + */ + if (res == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + { + *reason = EMP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REJECT_REASON_SELF_SIGNED; + return FALSE; + } + } return verification_output_to_reason (res, verify_output, reason); } @@ -233,13 +256,13 @@ real_start_verification (EmpathyTLSVerifier *self) } } - if (priv->trusted_ca_list->len > 0) - { - res = verify_last_certificate (self, - g_ptr_array_index (priv->cert_chain, num_certs - 1), - &reason); - } + res = verify_last_certificate (self, + g_ptr_array_index (priv->cert_chain, num_certs - 1), + &reason); + DEBUG ("Last verification gave result %d with reason %u", res, reason); + + out: if (!res) { abort_verification (self, reason); |