Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
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* | cmd/bootnode, eth, p2p, p2p/discover: clean up the seeder and mesh into eth. | Péter Szilágyi | 2015-04-24 | 1 | -114/+0 |
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* | p2p/discovery: use the seed table for finding nodes, auto drop stale ones | Péter Szilágyi | 2015-04-24 | 1 | -3/+30 |
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* | cmd, eth, p2p, p2p/discover: init and clean up the seed cache | Péter Szilágyi | 2015-04-24 | 1 | -0/+4 |
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* | p2p/discover: store nodes in leveldb | Felix Lange | 2015-04-24 | 1 | -12/+71 |
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* | p2p/discover: remove unused field Node.activeStamp | Felix Lange | 2015-04-13 | 1 | -15/+0 |
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* | p2p/discover: implement node bonding | Felix Lange | 2015-04-01 | 1 | -2/+41 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This a fix for an attack vector where the discovery protocol could be used to amplify traffic in a DDOS attack. A malicious actor would send a findnode request with the IP address and UDP port of the target as the source address. The recipient of the findnode packet would then send a neighbors packet (which is 16x the size of findnode) to the victim. Our solution is to require a 'bond' with the sender of findnode. If no bond exists, the findnode packet is not processed. A bond between nodes α and β is created when α replies to a ping from β. This (initial) version of the bonding implementation might still be vulnerable against replay attacks during the expiration time window. We will add stricter source address validation later. | ||||
* | %#x => %x | obscuren | 2015-03-20 | 1 | -2/+2 |
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* | p2p/discover: add NodeID.Pubkey | Felix Lange | 2015-03-04 | 1 | -0/+15 |
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* | p2p/discover: code review fixes | Felix Lange | 2015-02-13 | 1 | -1/+3 |
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* | p2p/discover: add node URL functions, distinguish TCP/UDP ports | Felix Lange | 2015-02-07 | 1 | -0/+289 |
The discovery RPC protocol does not yet distinguish TCP and UDP ports. But it can't hurt to do so in our internal model. |