path: root/p2p/crypto.go

package p2p

import (
    // "bytes"
    "crypto/ecdsa"
    "crypto/rand"
    "fmt"
    // "io"

    "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto"
    "github.com/obscuren/ecies"
    "github.com/obscuren/secp256k1-go"
)

var (
    sskLen int = 16                    // ecies.MaxSharedKeyLength(pubKey) / 2
    sigLen int = 65                    // elliptic S256
    keyLen int = 32                    // ECDSA
    msgLen int = sigLen + 3*keyLen + 1 // 162
    resLen int = 65
)

// aesSecret, macSecret, egressMac, ingress
type secretRW struct {
    aesSecret, macSecret, egressMac, ingressMac []byte
}

type cryptoId struct {
    prvKey    *ecdsa.PrivateKey
    pubKey    *ecdsa.PublicKey
    pubKeyDER []byte
}

func newCryptoId(id ClientIdentity) (self *cryptoId, err error) {
    // will be at server  init
    var prvKeyDER []byte = id.PrivKey()
    if prvKeyDER == nil {
        err = fmt.Errorf("no private key for client")
        return
    }
    // initialise ecies private key via importing DER encoded keys (known via our own clientIdentity)
    var prvKey = crypto.ToECDSA(prvKeyDER)
    if prvKey == nil {
        err = fmt.Errorf("invalid private key for client")
        return
    }
    self = &cryptoId{
        prvKey: prvKey,
        // initialise public key from the imported private key
        pubKey: &prvKey.PublicKey,
        // to be created at server init shared between peers and sessions
        // for reuse, call wth ReadAt, no reset seek needed
    }
    self.pubKeyDER = id.Pubkey()
    return
}

// initAuth is called by peer if it initiated the connection
func (self *cryptoId) initAuth(remotePubKeyDER, sessionToken []byte) (auth []byte, initNonce []byte, remotePubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, err error) {
    // session init, common to both parties
    remotePubKey = crypto.ToECDSAPub(remotePubKeyDER)
    if remotePubKey == nil {
        err = fmt.Errorf("invalid remote public key")
        return
    }

    var tokenFlag byte
    if sessionToken == nil {
        // no session token found means we need to generate shared secret.
        // ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers
        // generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey
        if sessionToken, err = ecies.ImportECDSA(self.prvKey).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remotePubKey), sskLen, sskLen); err != nil {
            return
        }
        fmt.Printf("secret generated: %v %x", len(sessionToken), sessionToken)
        // tokenFlag = 0x00 // redundant
    } else {
        // for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session
        tokenFlag = 0x01
    }

    //E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, ecdh-shared-secret^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0)
    // E(remote-pubk, S(ecdhe-random, token^nonce) || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x1)
    // allocate msgLen long message,
    var msg []byte = make([]byte, msgLen)
    // generate sskLen long nonce
    initNonce = msg[msgLen-keyLen-1 : msgLen-1]
    // nonce = msg[msgLen-sskLen-1 : msgLen-1]
    if _, err = rand.Read(initNonce); err != nil {
        return
    }
    // create known message
    // ecdh-shared-secret^nonce for new peers
    // token^nonce for old peers
    var sharedSecret = Xor(sessionToken, initNonce)

    // generate random keypair to use for signing
    var ecdsaRandomPrvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
    if ecdsaRandomPrvKey, err = crypto.GenerateKey(); err != nil {
        return
    }
    // sign shared secret (message known to both parties): shared-secret
    var signature []byte
    // signature = sign(ecdhe-random, shared-secret)
    // uses secp256k1.Sign
    if signature, err = crypto.Sign(sharedSecret, ecdsaRandomPrvKey); err != nil {
        return
    }
    fmt.Printf("signature generated: %v %x", len(signature), signature)

    // message
    // signed-shared-secret || H(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || 0x0
    copy(msg, signature) // copy signed-shared-secret
    // H(ecdhe-random-pubk)
    copy(msg[sigLen:sigLen+keyLen], crypto.Sha3(crypto.FromECDSAPub(&ecdsaRandomPrvKey.PublicKey)))
    // pubkey copied to the correct segment.
    copy(msg[sigLen+keyLen:sigLen+2*keyLen], self.pubKeyDER)
    // nonce is already in the slice
    // stick tokenFlag byte to the end
    msg[msgLen-1] = tokenFlag

    fmt.Printf("plaintext message generated: %v %x", len(msg), msg)

    // encrypt using remote-pubk
    // auth = eciesEncrypt(remote-pubk, msg)

    if auth, err = crypto.Encrypt(remotePubKey, msg); err != nil {
        return
    }
    fmt.Printf("encrypted message generated: %v %x\n used pubkey: %x\n", len(auth), auth, crypto.FromECDSAPub(remotePubKey))

    return
}

// verifyAuth is called by peer if it accepted (but not initiated) the connection
func (self *cryptoId) verifyAuth(auth, sharedSecret []byte, remotePubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) (authResp []byte, respNonce []byte, initNonce []byte, remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, err error) {
    var msg []byte
    fmt.Printf("encrypted message received: %v %x\n used pubkey: %x\n", len(auth), auth, crypto.FromECDSAPub(self.pubKey))
    // they prove that msg is meant for me,
    // I prove I possess private key if i can read it
    if msg, err = crypto.Decrypt(self.prvKey, auth); err != nil {
        return
    }

    // var remoteNonce []byte = msg[msgLen-skLen-1 : msgLen-1]
    initNonce = msg[msgLen-keyLen-1 : msgLen-1]
    // I prove that i own prv key (to derive shared secret, and read nonce off encrypted msg) and that I own shared secret
    // they prove they own the private key belonging to ecdhe-random-pubk
    var signedMsg = Xor(sharedSecret, initNonce)
    var remoteRandomPubKeyDER []byte
    if remoteRandomPubKeyDER, err = secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(signedMsg, msg[:sigLen]); err != nil {
        return
    }
    remoteRandomPubKey = crypto.ToECDSAPub(remoteRandomPubKeyDER)
    if remoteRandomPubKey == nil {
        err = fmt.Errorf("invalid remote public key")
        return
    }

    var resp = make([]byte, 2*keyLen+1)
    // generate sskLen long nonce
    respNonce = msg[msgLen-keyLen-1 : msgLen-1]
    if _, err = rand.Read(respNonce); err != nil {
        return
    }
    // generate random keypair
    var ecdsaRandomPrvKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
    if ecdsaRandomPrvKey, err = crypto.GenerateKey(); err != nil {
        return
    }
    // var ecdsaRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
    //  ecdsaRandomPubKey= &ecdsaRandomPrvKey.PublicKey

    // message
    // E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x0)
    copy(resp[:keyLen], crypto.FromECDSAPub(&ecdsaRandomPrvKey.PublicKey))
    // pubkey copied to the correct segment.
    copy(resp[keyLen:2*keyLen], self.pubKeyDER)
    // nonce is already in the slice
    // stick tokenFlag byte to the end
    var tokenFlag byte
    if sharedSecret == nil {
    } else {
        // for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session
        tokenFlag = 0x01
    }
    resp[resLen] = tokenFlag

    // encrypt using remote-pubk
    // auth = eciesEncrypt(remote-pubk, msg)
    // why not encrypt with ecdhe-random-remote
    if authResp, err = crypto.Encrypt(remotePubKey, resp); err != nil {
        return
    }
    return
}

func (self *cryptoId) verifyAuthResp(auth []byte) (respNonce []byte, remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey, tokenFlag bool, err error) {
    var msg []byte
    // they prove that msg is meant for me,
    // I prove I possess private key if i can read it
    if msg, err = crypto.Decrypt(self.prvKey, auth); err != nil {
        return
    }

    respNonce = msg[resLen-keyLen-1 : resLen-1]
    var remoteRandomPubKeyDER = msg[:keyLen]
    remoteRandomPubKey = crypto.ToECDSAPub(remoteRandomPubKeyDER)
    if remoteRandomPubKey == nil {
        err = fmt.Errorf("invalid ecdh random remote public key")
        return
    }
    if msg[resLen-1] == 0x01 {
        tokenFlag = true
    }
    return
}

func (self *cryptoId) newSession(initNonce, respNonce, auth []byte, remoteRandomPubKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) (sessionToken []byte, rw *secretRW, err error) {
    // 3) Now we can trust ecdhe-random-pubk to derive new keys
    //ecdhe-shared-secret = ecdh.agree(ecdhe-random, remote-ecdhe-random-pubk)
    var dhSharedSecret []byte
    dhSharedSecret, err = ecies.ImportECDSA(self.prvKey).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(remoteRandomPubKey), sskLen, sskLen)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }
    // shared-secret = crypto.Sha3(ecdhe-shared-secret || crypto.Sha3(nonce || initiator-nonce))
    var sharedSecret = crypto.Sha3(append(dhSharedSecret, crypto.Sha3(append(respNonce, initNonce...))...))
    // token = crypto.Sha3(shared-secret)
    sessionToken = crypto.Sha3(sharedSecret)
    // aes-secret = crypto.Sha3(ecdhe-shared-secret || shared-secret)
    var aesSecret = crypto.Sha3(append(dhSharedSecret, sharedSecret...))
    // # destroy shared-secret
    // mac-secret = crypto.Sha3(ecdhe-shared-secret || aes-secret)
    var macSecret = crypto.Sha3(append(dhSharedSecret, aesSecret...))
    // # destroy ecdhe-shared-secret
    // egress-mac = crypto.Sha3(mac-secret^nonce || auth)
    var egressMac = crypto.Sha3(append(Xor(macSecret, respNonce), auth...))
    // # destroy nonce
    // ingress-mac = crypto.Sha3(mac-secret^initiator-nonce || auth),
    var ingressMac = crypto.Sha3(append(Xor(macSecret, initNonce), auth...))
    // # destroy remote-nonce
    rw = &secretRW{
        aesSecret:  aesSecret,
        macSecret:  macSecret,
        egressMac:  egressMac,
        ingressMac: ingressMac,
    }
    return
}

// should use cipher.xorBytes from crypto/cipher/xor.go for fast xor
func Xor(one, other []byte) (xor []byte) {
    xor = make([]byte, len(one))
    for i := 0; i < len(one); i++ {
        xor[i] = one[i] ^ other[i]
    }
    return
}