From 7d8155714b41cda27fd2c860361c36d33e89d0a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Lange Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 01:48:55 +0100 Subject: p2p: EIP-8 changes --- p2p/message_test.go | 3 +- p2p/peer.go | 3 + p2p/rlpx.go | 351 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- p2p/rlpx_test.go | 235 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 443 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-) (limited to 'p2p') diff --git a/p2p/message_test.go b/p2p/message_test.go index 8599b7e87..013214e21 100644 --- a/p2p/message_test.go +++ b/p2p/message_test.go @@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ func TestEOFSignal(t *testing.T) { } func unhex(str string) []byte { - b, err := hex.DecodeString(strings.Replace(str, "\n", "", -1)) + r := strings.NewReplacer("\t", "", " ", "", "\n", "") + b, err := hex.DecodeString(r.Replace(str)) if err != nil { panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid hex string: %q", str)) } diff --git a/p2p/peer.go b/p2p/peer.go index 72ed4069c..b9d6c099d 100644 --- a/p2p/peer.go +++ b/p2p/peer.go @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ type protoHandshake struct { Caps []Cap ListenPort uint64 ID discover.NodeID + + // Ignore additional fields (for forward compatibility). + Rest []rlp.RawValue `rlp:"tail"` } // Peer represents a connected remote node. diff --git a/p2p/rlpx.go b/p2p/rlpx.go index 8f429d6ec..9d6cba5b6 100644 --- a/p2p/rlpx.go +++ b/p2p/rlpx.go @@ -24,11 +24,14 @@ import ( "crypto/elliptic" "crypto/hmac" "crypto/rand" + "encoding/binary" "errors" "fmt" "hash" "io" + mrand "math/rand" "net" + "os" "sync" "time" @@ -51,9 +54,10 @@ const ( authMsgLen = sigLen + shaLen + pubLen + shaLen + 1 authRespLen = pubLen + shaLen + 1 - eciesBytes = 65 + 16 + 32 - encAuthMsgLen = authMsgLen + eciesBytes // size of the final ECIES payload sent as initiator's handshake - encAuthRespLen = authRespLen + eciesBytes // size of the final ECIES payload sent as receiver's handshake + eciesOverhead = 65 /* pubkey */ + 16 /* IV */ + 32 /* MAC */ + + encAuthMsgLen = authMsgLen + eciesOverhead // size of encrypted pre-EIP-8 initiator handshake + encAuthRespLen = authRespLen + eciesOverhead // size of encrypted pre-EIP-8 handshake reply // total timeout for encryption handshake and protocol // handshake in both directions. @@ -151,10 +155,6 @@ func readProtocolHandshake(rw MsgReader, our *protoHandshake) (*protoHandshake, if err := msg.Decode(&hs); err != nil { return nil, err } - // validate handshake info - if hs.Version != our.Version { - return nil, DiscIncompatibleVersion - } if (hs.ID == discover.NodeID{}) { return nil, DiscInvalidIdentity } @@ -200,6 +200,29 @@ type secrets struct { Token []byte } +// RLPx v4 handshake auth (defined in EIP-8). +type authMsgV4 struct { + gotPlain bool // whether read packet had plain format. + + Signature [sigLen]byte + InitiatorPubkey [pubLen]byte + Nonce [shaLen]byte + Version uint + + // Ignore additional fields (forward-compatibility) + Rest []rlp.RawValue `rlp:"tail"` +} + +// RLPx v4 handshake response (defined in EIP-8). +type authRespV4 struct { + RandomPubkey [pubLen]byte + Nonce [shaLen]byte + Version uint + + // Ignore additional fields (forward-compatibility) + Rest []rlp.RawValue `rlp:"tail"` +} + // secrets is called after the handshake is completed. // It extracts the connection secrets from the handshake values. func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) { @@ -215,7 +238,6 @@ func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) { RemoteID: h.remoteID, AES: aesSecret, MAC: crypto.Sha3(ecdheSecret, aesSecret), - Token: crypto.Sha3(sharedSecret), } // setup sha3 instances for the MACs @@ -234,114 +256,89 @@ func (h *encHandshake) secrets(auth, authResp []byte) (secrets, error) { return s, nil } -func (h *encHandshake) ecdhShared(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) { +// staticSharedSecret returns the static shared secret, the result +// of key agreement between the local and remote static node key. +func (h *encHandshake) staticSharedSecret(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) { return ecies.ImportECDSA(prv).GenerateShared(h.remotePub, sskLen, sskLen) } +var configSendEIP = os.Getenv("RLPX_EIP8") != "" + // initiatorEncHandshake negotiates a session token on conn. // it should be called on the dialing side of the connection. // // prv is the local client's private key. -// token is the token from a previous session with this node. func initiatorEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, remoteID discover.NodeID, token []byte) (s secrets, err error) { - h, err := newInitiatorHandshake(remoteID) + h := &encHandshake{initiator: true, remoteID: remoteID} + authMsg, err := h.makeAuthMsg(prv, token) if err != nil { return s, err } - auth, err := h.authMsg(prv, token) + var authPacket []byte + if configSendEIP { + authPacket, err = sealEIP8(authMsg, h) + } else { + authPacket, err = authMsg.sealPlain(h) + } if err != nil { return s, err } - if _, err = conn.Write(auth); err != nil { + if _, err = conn.Write(authPacket); err != nil { return s, err } - response := make([]byte, encAuthRespLen) - if _, err = io.ReadFull(conn, response); err != nil { + authRespMsg := new(authRespV4) + authRespPacket, err := readHandshakeMsg(authRespMsg, encAuthRespLen, prv, conn) + if err != nil { return s, err } - if err := h.decodeAuthResp(response, prv); err != nil { + if err := h.handleAuthResp(authRespMsg); err != nil { return s, err } - return h.secrets(auth, response) + return h.secrets(authPacket, authRespPacket) } -func newInitiatorHandshake(remoteID discover.NodeID) (*encHandshake, error) { - rpub, err := remoteID.Pubkey() +// makeAuthMsg creates the initiator handshake message. +func (h *encHandshake) makeAuthMsg(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) (*authMsgV4, error) { + rpub, err := h.remoteID.Pubkey() if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad remoteID: %v", err) } - // generate random initiator nonce - n := make([]byte, shaLen) - if _, err := rand.Read(n); err != nil { + h.remotePub = ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub) + // Generate random initiator nonce. + h.initNonce = make([]byte, shaLen) + if _, err := rand.Read(h.initNonce); err != nil { return nil, err } - // generate random keypair to use for signing - randpriv, err := ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil) + // Generate random keypair to for ECDH. + h.randomPrivKey, err = ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil) if err != nil { return nil, err } - h := &encHandshake{ - initiator: true, - remoteID: remoteID, - remotePub: ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub), - initNonce: n, - randomPrivKey: randpriv, - } - return h, nil -} - -// authMsg creates an encrypted initiator handshake message. -func (h *encHandshake) authMsg(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) ([]byte, error) { - var tokenFlag byte - if token == nil { - // no session token found means we need to generate shared secret. - // ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers - // generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey - var err error - if token, err = h.ecdhShared(prv); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } else { - // for known peers, we use stored token from the previous session - tokenFlag = 0x01 - } - // sign known message: - // ecdh-shared-secret^nonce for new peers - // token^nonce for old peers + // Sign known message: static-shared-secret ^ nonce + token, err = h.staticSharedSecret(prv) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } signed := xor(token, h.initNonce) signature, err := crypto.Sign(signed, h.randomPrivKey.ExportECDSA()) if err != nil { return nil, err } - // encode auth message - // signature || sha3(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || token-flag - msg := make([]byte, authMsgLen) - n := copy(msg, signature) - n += copy(msg[n:], crypto.Sha3(exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey))) - n += copy(msg[n:], crypto.FromECDSAPub(&prv.PublicKey)[1:]) - n += copy(msg[n:], h.initNonce) - msg[n] = tokenFlag - - // encrypt auth message using remote-pubk - return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, msg, nil, nil) + msg := new(authMsgV4) + copy(msg.Signature[:], signature) + copy(msg.InitiatorPubkey[:], crypto.FromECDSAPub(&prv.PublicKey)[1:]) + copy(msg.Nonce[:], h.initNonce) + msg.Version = 4 + return msg, nil } -// decodeAuthResp decode an encrypted authentication response message. -func (h *encHandshake) decodeAuthResp(auth []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error { - msg, err := crypto.Decrypt(prv, auth) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("could not decrypt auth response (%v)", err) - } - h.respNonce = msg[pubLen : pubLen+shaLen] - h.remoteRandomPub, err = importPublicKey(msg[:pubLen]) - if err != nil { - return err - } - // ignore token flag for now - return nil +func (h *encHandshake) handleAuthResp(msg *authRespV4) (err error) { + h.respNonce = msg.Nonce[:] + h.remoteRandomPub, err = importPublicKey(msg.RandomPubkey[:]) + return err } // receiverEncHandshake negotiates a session token on conn. @@ -350,99 +347,165 @@ func (h *encHandshake) decodeAuthResp(auth []byte, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error // prv is the local client's private key. // token is the token from a previous session with this node. func receiverEncHandshake(conn io.ReadWriter, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) (s secrets, err error) { - // read remote auth sent by initiator. - auth := make([]byte, encAuthMsgLen) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, auth); err != nil { + authMsg := new(authMsgV4) + authPacket, err := readHandshakeMsg(authMsg, encAuthMsgLen, prv, conn) + if err != nil { return s, err } - h, err := decodeAuthMsg(prv, token, auth) - if err != nil { + h := new(encHandshake) + if err := h.handleAuthMsg(authMsg, prv); err != nil { return s, err } - // send auth response - resp, err := h.authResp(prv, token) + authRespMsg, err := h.makeAuthResp() if err != nil { return s, err } - if _, err = conn.Write(resp); err != nil { - return s, err + var authRespPacket []byte + if authMsg.gotPlain { + authRespPacket, err = authRespMsg.sealPlain(h) + } else { + authRespPacket, err = sealEIP8(authRespMsg, h) } - - return h.secrets(auth, resp) -} - -func decodeAuthMsg(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte, auth []byte) (*encHandshake, error) { - var err error - h := new(encHandshake) - // generate random keypair for session - h.randomPrivKey, err = ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil) if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - // generate random nonce - h.respNonce = make([]byte, shaLen) - if _, err = rand.Read(h.respNonce); err != nil { - return nil, err + return s, err } - - msg, err := crypto.Decrypt(prv, auth) - if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not decrypt auth message (%v)", err) + if _, err = conn.Write(authRespPacket); err != nil { + return s, err } + return h.secrets(authPacket, authRespPacket) +} - // decode message parameters - // signature || sha3(ecdhe-random-pubk) || pubk || nonce || token-flag - h.initNonce = msg[authMsgLen-shaLen-1 : authMsgLen-1] - copy(h.remoteID[:], msg[sigLen+shaLen:sigLen+shaLen+pubLen]) +func (h *encHandshake) handleAuthMsg(msg *authMsgV4, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error { + // Import the remote identity. + h.initNonce = msg.Nonce[:] + h.remoteID = msg.InitiatorPubkey rpub, err := h.remoteID.Pubkey() if err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad remoteID: %#v", err) + return fmt.Errorf("bad remoteID: %#v", err) } h.remotePub = ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(rpub) - // recover remote random pubkey from signed message. - if token == nil { - // TODO: it is an error if the initiator has a token and we don't. check that. - - // no session token means we need to generate shared secret. - // ecies shared secret is used as initial session token for new peers. - // generate shared key from prv and remote pubkey. - if token, err = h.ecdhShared(prv); err != nil { - return nil, err + // Generate random keypair for ECDH. + // If a private key is already set, use it instead of generating one (for testing). + if h.randomPrivKey == nil { + h.randomPrivKey, err = ecies.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, secp256k1.S256(), nil) + if err != nil { + return err } } + + // Check the signature. + token, err := h.staticSharedSecret(prv) + if err != nil { + return err + } signedMsg := xor(token, h.initNonce) - remoteRandomPub, err := secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(signedMsg, msg[:sigLen]) + remoteRandomPub, err := secp256k1.RecoverPubkey(signedMsg, msg.Signature[:]) if err != nil { + return err + } + h.remoteRandomPub, _ = importPublicKey(remoteRandomPub) + return nil +} + +func (h *encHandshake) makeAuthResp() (msg *authRespV4, err error) { + // Generate random nonce. + h.respNonce = make([]byte, shaLen) + if _, err = rand.Read(h.respNonce); err != nil { return nil, err } - // validate the sha3 of recovered pubkey - remoteRandomPubMAC := msg[sigLen : sigLen+shaLen] - shaRemoteRandomPub := crypto.Sha3(remoteRandomPub[1:]) - if !bytes.Equal(remoteRandomPubMAC, shaRemoteRandomPub) { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("sha3 of recovered ephemeral pubkey does not match checksum in auth message") + msg = new(authRespV4) + copy(msg.Nonce[:], h.respNonce) + copy(msg.RandomPubkey[:], exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey)) + msg.Version = 4 + return msg, nil +} + +func (msg *authMsgV4) sealPlain(h *encHandshake) ([]byte, error) { + buf := make([]byte, authMsgLen) + n := copy(buf, msg.Signature[:]) + n += copy(buf[n:], crypto.Sha3(exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey))) + n += copy(buf[n:], msg.InitiatorPubkey[:]) + n += copy(buf[n:], msg.Nonce[:]) + buf[n] = 0 // token-flag + return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, buf, nil, nil) +} + +func (msg *authMsgV4) decodePlain(input []byte) { + n := copy(msg.Signature[:], input) + n += shaLen // skip sha3(initiator-ephemeral-pubk) + n += copy(msg.InitiatorPubkey[:], input[n:]) + n += copy(msg.Nonce[:], input[n:]) + msg.Version = 4 + msg.gotPlain = true +} + +func (msg *authRespV4) sealPlain(hs *encHandshake) ([]byte, error) { + buf := make([]byte, authRespLen) + n := copy(buf, msg.RandomPubkey[:]) + n += copy(buf[n:], msg.Nonce[:]) + return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, hs.remotePub, buf, nil, nil) +} + +func (msg *authRespV4) decodePlain(input []byte) { + n := copy(msg.RandomPubkey[:], input) + n += copy(msg.Nonce[:], input[n:]) + msg.Version = 4 +} + +var padSpace = make([]byte, 300) + +func sealEIP8(msg interface{}, h *encHandshake) ([]byte, error) { + buf := new(bytes.Buffer) + if err := rlp.Encode(buf, msg); err != nil { + return nil, err } + // pad with random amount of data. the amount needs to be at least 100 bytes to make + // the message distinguishable from pre-EIP-8 handshakes. + pad := padSpace[:mrand.Intn(len(padSpace)-100)+100] + buf.Write(pad) + prefix := make([]byte, 2) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(prefix, uint16(buf.Len()+eciesOverhead)) - h.remoteRandomPub, _ = importPublicKey(remoteRandomPub) - return h, nil -} - -// authResp generates the encrypted authentication response message. -func (h *encHandshake) authResp(prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, token []byte) ([]byte, error) { - // responder auth message - // E(remote-pubk, ecdhe-random-pubk || nonce || 0x0) - resp := make([]byte, authRespLen) - n := copy(resp, exportPubkey(&h.randomPrivKey.PublicKey)) - n += copy(resp[n:], h.respNonce) - if token == nil { - resp[n] = 0 - } else { - resp[n] = 1 + enc, err := ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, buf.Bytes(), nil, prefix) + return append(prefix, enc...), err +} + +type plainDecoder interface { + decodePlain([]byte) +} + +func readHandshakeMsg(msg plainDecoder, plainSize int, prv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + buf := make([]byte, plainSize) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf); err != nil { + return buf, err + } + // Attempt decoding pre-EIP-8 "plain" format. + key := ecies.ImportECDSA(prv) + if dec, err := key.Decrypt(rand.Reader, buf, nil, nil); err == nil { + msg.decodePlain(dec) + return buf, nil } - // encrypt using remote-pubk - return ecies.Encrypt(rand.Reader, h.remotePub, resp, nil, nil) + // Could be EIP-8 format, try that. + prefix := buf[:2] + size := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(prefix) + if size < uint16(plainSize) { + return buf, fmt.Errorf("size underflow, need at least %d bytes", plainSize) + } + buf = append(buf, make([]byte, size-uint16(plainSize)+2)...) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[plainSize:]); err != nil { + return buf, err + } + dec, err := key.Decrypt(rand.Reader, buf[2:], nil, prefix) + if err != nil { + return buf, err + } + // Can't use rlp.DecodeBytes here because it rejects + // trailing data (forward-compatibility). + s := rlp.NewStream(bytes.NewReader(dec), 0) + return buf, s.Decode(msg) } // importPublicKey unmarshals 512 bit public keys. @@ -458,7 +521,11 @@ func importPublicKey(pubKey []byte) (*ecies.PublicKey, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid public key length %v (expect 64/65)", len(pubKey)) } // TODO: fewer pointless conversions - return ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(crypto.ToECDSAPub(pubKey65)), nil + pub := crypto.ToECDSAPub(pubKey65) + if pub.X == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid public key") + } + return ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(pub), nil } func exportPubkey(pub *ecies.PublicKey) []byte { diff --git a/p2p/rlpx_test.go b/p2p/rlpx_test.go index 7cc7548e2..f9583e224 100644 --- a/p2p/rlpx_test.go +++ b/p2p/rlpx_test.go @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import ( "crypto/rand" "errors" "fmt" + "io" "io/ioutil" "net" "reflect" @@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) { wg.Add(2) go func() { defer wg.Done() + defer fd1.Close() rlpx := newRLPX(fd0) remid, err := rlpx.doEncHandshake(prv0, node1) if err != nil { @@ -178,6 +180,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("dial side proto handshake error: %v", err) return } + phs.Rest = nil if !reflect.DeepEqual(phs, hs1) { t.Errorf("dial side proto handshake mismatch:\ngot: %s\nwant: %s\n", spew.Sdump(phs), spew.Sdump(hs1)) return @@ -186,6 +189,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) { }() go func() { defer wg.Done() + defer fd1.Close() rlpx := newRLPX(fd1) remid, err := rlpx.doEncHandshake(prv1, nil) if err != nil { @@ -202,6 +206,7 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) { t.Errorf("listen side proto handshake error: %v", err) return } + phs.Rest = nil if !reflect.DeepEqual(phs, hs0) { t.Errorf("listen side proto handshake mismatch:\ngot: %s\nwant: %s\n", spew.Sdump(phs), spew.Sdump(hs0)) return @@ -216,7 +221,6 @@ func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) { func TestProtocolHandshakeErrors(t *testing.T) { our := &protoHandshake{Version: 3, Caps: []Cap{{"foo", 2}, {"bar", 3}}, Name: "quux"} - id := randomID() tests := []struct { code uint64 msg interface{} @@ -242,11 +246,6 @@ func TestProtocolHandshakeErrors(t *testing.T) { msg: []byte{1, 2, 3}, err: newPeerError(errInvalidMsg, "(code 0) (size 4) rlp: expected input list for p2p.protoHandshake"), }, - { - code: handshakeMsg, - msg: &protoHandshake{Version: 9944, ID: id}, - err: DiscIncompatibleVersion, - }, { code: handshakeMsg, msg: &protoHandshake{Version: 3}, @@ -374,3 +373,227 @@ func TestRLPXFrameRW(t *testing.T) { } } } + +type handshakeAuthTest struct { + input string + isPlain bool + wantVersion uint + wantRest []rlp.RawValue +} + +var eip8HandshakeAuthTests = []handshakeAuthTest{ + // (Auth₁) RLPx v4 plain encoding + { + input: ` + 048ca79ad18e4b0659fab4853fe5bc58eb83992980f4c9cc147d2aa31532efd29a3d3dc6a3d89eaf + 913150cfc777ce0ce4af2758bf4810235f6e6ceccfee1acc6b22c005e9e3a49d6448610a58e98744 + ba3ac0399e82692d67c1f58849050b3024e21a52c9d3b01d871ff5f210817912773e610443a9ef14 + 2e91cdba0bd77b5fdf0769b05671fc35f83d83e4d3b0b000c6b2a1b1bba89e0fc51bf4e460df3105 + c444f14be226458940d6061c296350937ffd5e3acaceeaaefd3c6f74be8e23e0f45163cc7ebd7622 + 0f0128410fd05250273156d548a414444ae2f7dea4dfca2d43c057adb701a715bf59f6fb66b2d1d2 + 0f2c703f851cbf5ac47396d9ca65b6260bd141ac4d53e2de585a73d1750780db4c9ee4cd4d225173 + a4592ee77e2bd94d0be3691f3b406f9bba9b591fc63facc016bfa8 + `, + isPlain: true, + wantVersion: 4, + }, + // (Auth₂) EIP-8 encoding + { + input: ` + 01b304ab7578555167be8154d5cc456f567d5ba302662433674222360f08d5f1534499d3678b513b + 0fca474f3a514b18e75683032eb63fccb16c156dc6eb2c0b1593f0d84ac74f6e475f1b8d56116b84 + 9634a8c458705bf83a626ea0384d4d7341aae591fae42ce6bd5c850bfe0b999a694a49bbbaf3ef6c + da61110601d3b4c02ab6c30437257a6e0117792631a4b47c1d52fc0f8f89caadeb7d02770bf999cc + 147d2df3b62e1ffb2c9d8c125a3984865356266bca11ce7d3a688663a51d82defaa8aad69da39ab6 + d5470e81ec5f2a7a47fb865ff7cca21516f9299a07b1bc63ba56c7a1a892112841ca44b6e0034dee + 70c9adabc15d76a54f443593fafdc3b27af8059703f88928e199cb122362a4b35f62386da7caad09 + c001edaeb5f8a06d2b26fb6cb93c52a9fca51853b68193916982358fe1e5369e249875bb8d0d0ec3 + 6f917bc5e1eafd5896d46bd61ff23f1a863a8a8dcd54c7b109b771c8e61ec9c8908c733c0263440e + 2aa067241aaa433f0bb053c7b31a838504b148f570c0ad62837129e547678c5190341e4f1693956c + 3bf7678318e2d5b5340c9e488eefea198576344afbdf66db5f51204a6961a63ce072c8926c + `, + wantVersion: 4, + wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{}, + }, + // (Auth₃) RLPx v4 EIP-8 encoding with version 56, additional list elements + { + input: ` + 01b8044c6c312173685d1edd268aa95e1d495474c6959bcdd10067ba4c9013df9e40ff45f5bfd6f7 + 2471f93a91b493f8e00abc4b80f682973de715d77ba3a005a242eb859f9a211d93a347fa64b597bf + 280a6b88e26299cf263b01b8dfdb712278464fd1c25840b995e84d367d743f66c0e54a586725b7bb + f12acca27170ae3283c1073adda4b6d79f27656993aefccf16e0d0409fe07db2dc398a1b7e8ee93b + cd181485fd332f381d6a050fba4c7641a5112ac1b0b61168d20f01b479e19adf7fdbfa0905f63352 + bfc7e23cf3357657455119d879c78d3cf8c8c06375f3f7d4861aa02a122467e069acaf513025ff19 + 6641f6d2810ce493f51bee9c966b15c5043505350392b57645385a18c78f14669cc4d960446c1757 + 1b7c5d725021babbcd786957f3d17089c084907bda22c2b2675b4378b114c601d858802a55345a15 + 116bc61da4193996187ed70d16730e9ae6b3bb8787ebcaea1871d850997ddc08b4f4ea668fbf3740 + 7ac044b55be0908ecb94d4ed172ece66fd31bfdadf2b97a8bc690163ee11f5b575a4b44e36e2bfb2 + f0fce91676fd64c7773bac6a003f481fddd0bae0a1f31aa27504e2a533af4cef3b623f4791b2cca6 + d490 + `, + wantVersion: 56, + wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{{0x01}, {0x02}, {0xC2, 0x04, 0x05}}, + }, +} + +type handshakeAckTest struct { + input string + wantVersion uint + wantRest []rlp.RawValue +} + +var eip8HandshakeRespTests = []handshakeAckTest{ + // (Ack₁) RLPx v4 plain encoding + { + input: ` + 049f8abcfa9c0dc65b982e98af921bc0ba6e4243169348a236abe9df5f93aa69d99cadddaa387662 + b0ff2c08e9006d5a11a278b1b3331e5aaabf0a32f01281b6f4ede0e09a2d5f585b26513cb794d963 + 5a57563921c04a9090b4f14ee42be1a5461049af4ea7a7f49bf4c97a352d39c8d02ee4acc416388c + 1c66cec761d2bc1c72da6ba143477f049c9d2dde846c252c111b904f630ac98e51609b3b1f58168d + dca6505b7196532e5f85b259a20c45e1979491683fee108e9660edbf38f3add489ae73e3dda2c71b + d1497113d5c755e942d1 + `, + wantVersion: 4, + }, + // (Ack₂) EIP-8 encoding + { + input: ` + 01ea0451958701280a56482929d3b0757da8f7fbe5286784beead59d95089c217c9b917788989470 + b0e330cc6e4fb383c0340ed85fab836ec9fb8a49672712aeabbdfd1e837c1ff4cace34311cd7f4de + 05d59279e3524ab26ef753a0095637ac88f2b499b9914b5f64e143eae548a1066e14cd2f4bd7f814 + c4652f11b254f8a2d0191e2f5546fae6055694aed14d906df79ad3b407d94692694e259191cde171 + ad542fc588fa2b7333313d82a9f887332f1dfc36cea03f831cb9a23fea05b33deb999e85489e645f + 6aab1872475d488d7bd6c7c120caf28dbfc5d6833888155ed69d34dbdc39c1f299be1057810f34fb + e754d021bfca14dc989753d61c413d261934e1a9c67ee060a25eefb54e81a4d14baff922180c395d + 3f998d70f46f6b58306f969627ae364497e73fc27f6d17ae45a413d322cb8814276be6ddd13b885b + 201b943213656cde498fa0e9ddc8e0b8f8a53824fbd82254f3e2c17e8eaea009c38b4aa0a3f306e8 + 797db43c25d68e86f262e564086f59a2fc60511c42abfb3057c247a8a8fe4fb3ccbadde17514b7ac + 8000cdb6a912778426260c47f38919a91f25f4b5ffb455d6aaaf150f7e5529c100ce62d6d92826a7 + 1778d809bdf60232ae21ce8a437eca8223f45ac37f6487452ce626f549b3b5fdee26afd2072e4bc7 + 5833c2464c805246155289f4 + `, + wantVersion: 4, + wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{}, + }, + // (Ack₃) EIP-8 encoding with version 57, additional list elements + { + input: ` + 01f004076e58aae772bb101ab1a8e64e01ee96e64857ce82b1113817c6cdd52c09d26f7b90981cd7 + ae835aeac72e1573b8a0225dd56d157a010846d888dac7464baf53f2ad4e3d584531fa203658fab0 + 3a06c9fd5e35737e417bc28c1cbf5e5dfc666de7090f69c3b29754725f84f75382891c561040ea1d + dc0d8f381ed1b9d0d4ad2a0ec021421d847820d6fa0ba66eaf58175f1b235e851c7e2124069fbc20 + 2888ddb3ac4d56bcbd1b9b7eab59e78f2e2d400905050f4a92dec1c4bdf797b3fc9b2f8e84a482f3 + d800386186712dae00d5c386ec9387a5e9c9a1aca5a573ca91082c7d68421f388e79127a5177d4f8 + 590237364fd348c9611fa39f78dcdceee3f390f07991b7b47e1daa3ebcb6ccc9607811cb17ce51f1 + c8c2c5098dbdd28fca547b3f58c01a424ac05f869f49c6a34672ea2cbbc558428aa1fe48bbfd6115 + 8b1b735a65d99f21e70dbc020bfdface9f724a0d1fb5895db971cc81aa7608baa0920abb0a565c9c + 436e2fd13323428296c86385f2384e408a31e104670df0791d93e743a3a5194ee6b076fb6323ca59 + 3011b7348c16cf58f66b9633906ba54a2ee803187344b394f75dd2e663a57b956cb830dd7a908d4f + 39a2336a61ef9fda549180d4ccde21514d117b6c6fd07a9102b5efe710a32af4eeacae2cb3b1dec0 + 35b9593b48b9d3ca4c13d245d5f04169b0b1 + `, + wantVersion: 57, + wantRest: []rlp.RawValue{{0x06}, {0xC2, 0x07, 0x08}, {0x81, 0xFA}}, + }, +} + +func TestHandshakeForwardCompatibility(t *testing.T) { + var ( + keyA, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("49a7b37aa6f6645917e7b807e9d1c00d4fa71f18343b0d4122a4d2df64dd6fee") + keyB, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("b71c71a67e1177ad4e901695e1b4b9ee17ae16c6668d313eac2f96dbcda3f291") + pubA = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&keyA.PublicKey)[1:] + pubB = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&keyB.PublicKey)[1:] + ephA, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("869d6ecf5211f1cc60418a13b9d870b22959d0c16f02bec714c960dd2298a32d") + ephB, _ = crypto.HexToECDSA("e238eb8e04fee6511ab04c6dd3c89ce097b11f25d584863ac2b6d5b35b1847e4") + ephPubA = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&ephA.PublicKey)[1:] + ephPubB = crypto.FromECDSAPub(&ephB.PublicKey)[1:] + nonceA = unhex("7e968bba13b6c50e2c4cd7f241cc0d64d1ac25c7f5952df231ac6a2bda8ee5d6") + nonceB = unhex("559aead08264d5795d3909718cdd05abd49572e84fe55590eef31a88a08fdffd") + _, _, _, _ = pubA, pubB, ephPubA, ephPubB + authSignature = unhex("299ca6acfd35e3d72d8ba3d1e2b60b5561d5af5218eb5bc182045769eb4226910a301acae3b369fffc4a4899d6b02531e89fd4fe36a2cf0d93607ba470b50f7800") + _ = authSignature + ) + makeAuth := func(test handshakeAuthTest) *authMsgV4 { + msg := &authMsgV4{Version: test.wantVersion, Rest: test.wantRest, gotPlain: test.isPlain} + copy(msg.Signature[:], authSignature) + copy(msg.InitiatorPubkey[:], pubA) + copy(msg.Nonce[:], nonceA) + return msg + } + makeAck := func(test handshakeAckTest) *authRespV4 { + msg := &authRespV4{Version: test.wantVersion, Rest: test.wantRest} + copy(msg.RandomPubkey[:], ephPubB) + copy(msg.Nonce[:], nonceB) + return msg + } + + // check auth msg parsing + for _, test := range eip8HandshakeAuthTests { + r := bytes.NewReader(unhex(test.input)) + msg := new(authMsgV4) + ciphertext, err := readHandshakeMsg(msg, encAuthMsgLen, keyB, r) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("error for input %x:\n %v", unhex(test.input), err) + continue + } + if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, unhex(test.input)) { + t.Errorf("wrong ciphertext for input %x:\n %x", unhex(test.input), ciphertext) + } + want := makeAuth(test) + if !reflect.DeepEqual(msg, want) { + t.Errorf("wrong msg for input %x:\ngot %s\nwant %s", unhex(test.input), spew.Sdump(msg), spew.Sdump(want)) + } + } + + // check auth resp parsing + for _, test := range eip8HandshakeRespTests { + input := unhex(test.input) + r := bytes.NewReader(input) + msg := new(authRespV4) + ciphertext, err := readHandshakeMsg(msg, encAuthRespLen, keyA, r) + if err != nil { + t.Errorf("error for input %x:\n %v", input, err) + continue + } + if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, input) { + t.Errorf("wrong ciphertext for input %x:\n %x", input, err) + } + want := makeAck(test) + if !reflect.DeepEqual(msg, want) { + t.Errorf("wrong msg for input %x:\ngot %s\nwant %s", input, spew.Sdump(msg), spew.Sdump(want)) + } + } + + // check derivation for (Auth₂, Ack₂) on recipient side + var ( + hs = &encHandshake{ + initiator: false, + respNonce: nonceB, + randomPrivKey: ecies.ImportECDSA(ephB), + } + authCiphertext = unhex(eip8HandshakeAuthTests[1].input) + authRespCiphertext = unhex(eip8HandshakeRespTests[1].input) + authMsg = makeAuth(eip8HandshakeAuthTests[1]) + wantAES = unhex("80e8632c05fed6fc2a13b0f8d31a3cf645366239170ea067065aba8e28bac487") + wantMAC = unhex("2ea74ec5dae199227dff1af715362700e989d889d7a493cb0639691efb8e5f98") + wantFooIngressHash = unhex("0c7ec6340062cc46f5e9f1e3cf86f8c8c403c5a0964f5df0ebd34a75ddc86db5") + ) + if err := hs.handleAuthMsg(authMsg, keyB); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("handleAuthMsg: %v", err) + } + derived, err := hs.secrets(authCiphertext, authRespCiphertext) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("secrets: %v", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(derived.AES, wantAES) { + t.Errorf("aes-secret mismatch:\ngot %x\nwant %x", derived.AES, wantAES) + } + if !bytes.Equal(derived.MAC, wantMAC) { + t.Errorf("mac-secret mismatch:\ngot %x\nwant %x", derived.MAC, wantMAC) + } + io.WriteString(derived.IngressMAC, "foo") + fooIngressHash := derived.IngressMAC.Sum(nil) + if !bytes.Equal(fooIngressHash, wantFooIngressHash) { + t.Errorf("ingress-mac('foo') mismatch:\ngot %x\nwant %x", fooIngressHash, wantFooIngressHash) + } +} -- cgit v1.2.3